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MENTAL IMPAIRMENTS AND THE REHABILITATION
ACT OF 1973
David Allen Larson*
The Rehabilitation Act of 19731 assists disabled persons affected by
either physical or mental impairments by providing for rehabilitative
services and by offering protection from certain forms of discrimination.
The Act's provisions include limited protection from employment dis-
crimination. 2 The specific impairments intended to be covered by this
statute, however, are not completely apparent from either the act itself
or the federal regulations issued to interpret the act.3 Given the often
elusive nature of the sciences of psychology and psychiatry, it is par-
ticularly intriguing to examine how courts have analyzed allegations of
mental impairments. In other words, what mental disabilities will be
recognized as impairments under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?
Subchapter V of the Rehabilitation Act is the focus of this article.
Under that subchapter, a plaintiff must first establish that the defendant
is covered by the Act. 4 It must also be shown that the complainant
suffers from an impairment;5 that this impairment results in a substantial
limitation;6 and that the limitation affects a major life activity. 7 In most
instances, the defendant acknowledges reliance upon the plaintiff's dis-
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1. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
2. See infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
5. Id. Although the statute and regulations provide guidance in determining what
is a protected impairment, they do not expressly identify the specific disabilities to be
protected. This article will examine cases that serve as examples of how courts make this
determination.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1985 & Supp. 1987). See E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall,
497 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (D. Hawaii 1980) (determining "substantial limitation" requires
an examination which focuses upon each claimant's specific circumstances; looking to the
number and type of jobs from which the impaired person is disqualified, the geographical
area to which the individual has reasonable access, and the individual's job expectations
and training).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B). See Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244
(6th Cir. 1985) (visual impairment of stabismus, or crossed-eyes, is not a substantial
limitation on a major life activity).
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ability.' The outcome will then depend upon whether the plaintiff is
qualified for the position and whether the defendant can reasonably
accommodate the plaintiff's disabilities. 9
This article examines the question of whether an asserted mental
disorder should be regarded as a statutory impairment. The article begins
by outlining the Rehabilitation Act and by discussing diagnostic diffi-
culties that exist in the mental health field. It then surveys specific cases
arising under the Rehabilitation Act. Selected cases reviewing state stat-
utory language are also examined. The article provides a broad discussion
of the questions and concerns that must be considered when formulating
a nondiscrimination policy protecting mentally impaired persons. It con-
cludes by suggesting an approach for handling cases alleging discrimi-
nation due to a mental impairment.
THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides a definition for the term
"individuals with handicaps":
(8) (A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), the
term "individual with handicaps" means any individual who (i)
has a physical or mental disability which for such individual
constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment
and (ii) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of em-
ployability from vocational rehabilitation services provided pur-
suant to subchapters I and III of this chapter.
(B) Subject to the second sentence of this subparagraph, the
term "individual with handicaps" means, for purposes of sub-
chapters IV and V of this chapter, any person who (i) has a
8. If the defendant denies that his or her decision was motivated by plaintiff's
disability, the plaintiff can rely upon the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), approach to establish motivation. See Reynolds v. Brock, 815
F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987), citing United States-Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1481-82 (1983); Texas Dep't. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981). According to
that approach, the plaintiff must establish that he or she is qualified for a position,
applied and was rejected. The model is subject to adjustment to fit particular fact situations.
The burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
If the plaintiff comes forward with evidence sufficient to satisfy this burden, the plaintiff
can still argue that the reason is pretextual.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. 1987) requires affirmative action for "qualified" indi-
viduals. Section 794 protects "otherwise qualified" individuals. An "otherwise qualified"
individual is someone qualified despite his or her handicap. Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 2367 (1979). See School Board of
Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1131 nn.17 and 19 (1987), where the
Supreme Court explains the duty of reasonable accommodation.
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physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of
such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment. For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title
as such sections relate to employment, such term does not include
any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current
use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing
the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by
reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute
a direct threat to property or the safety of others ....
(17)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), for purposes
of this chapter the term "individual with severe handicaps"
means an individual with handicaps (as defined in paragraph
(8))-
(i) who has a severe physical or mental disability which
seriously limits one or more functional capabilities (such
as mobility, communication, self-care, self-direction, in-
terpersonal skills, work tolerance, or work skills) in terms
of employability;
(ii) whose vocational rehabilitation can be expected to
require multiple vocational rehabilitation services over
an extended period of time; and
(iii) who has one or more physical or mental disabilities
resulting from amputation, arthritis, autism, blindness,
burn injury, cancer, cerebral palsy, cystic fibrosis, deaf-
ness, head injury, heart disease, hemiplegia, hemophilia,
respiratory or pulmonary dysfunction, mental retarda-
tion, mental illness, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystro-
phy, musculo-skeletal disorders, neurological disorders
(including stroke and epilepsy), paraplegia, quadriplegia,
and other spinal cord conditions, sickle cell anemia,
specific learning disability, end-stage renal disease, or
another disability or combination of disabilities deter-
mined on the basis of an evaluation of rehabilitation
potential to cause comparable substantial functional lim-
itation. 10
Using this language as a starting point, one can begin to identify
persons protected by the legislation. Employers who are recipients of
federal financial assistance are subject to the provisions of the Reha-
bilitation Act." Executive Order 12250 directs those executive agencies
10. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8), (17)(A) (Supp. 1987).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (Supp. 1987).
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granting financial assistance to issue guidelines for the programs and
organizations receiving that assistance.' 2 Executive Order 12250 also di-
rects the Department of Justice to manage the implementation of section
794.13 Pursuant to that directive, the Department of Justice has issued
regulations that further define protected disabilities.
(b) ... (1) "Physical or mental impairment" means: (i) any
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; res-
piratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive;
digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endo-
crine; or (ii) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities. The term "physical or mental
impairment" includes, but is not limited to, such diseases and
conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impair-
ments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple
sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation,
emotional illness and drug addiction, and alcoholism.'
4
Furthermore, the agencies granting assistance have issued their own
regulations.
Employers that have contracts with the federal government in excess
of $2,500 are covered by section 793.16 The Department of Labor, which
is responsible for this section, has also issued regulations defining "hand-
icapped individuals.""' Section 791 establishes an Interagency Committee
12. Executive Order 12250, 3 C.F.R. § 298 (1980).
1-201. The Attorney General shall coordinate the implementation and enforce-
ment by Executive agencies of various nondiscrimination provisions of the fol-
lowing laws: ...(c) section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended
(29 U.S.C. 794) ....
1-402. Each Executive Agency responsible for implementing a nondiscrimination
provision of a law covered by this order shall issue appropriate implementing
directives (whether in the nature of regulations or policy guidance). To the
extent permitted by law, they shall be consistent with the requirements prescribed
by the Attorney General pursuant to this Order and shall be subject to the
approval of the Attorney General, who may require that some or all of them
be submitted for approval before taking effect.
13. Executive Order 12250, 3 C.F.R. § 298 (1980). 1-1. Delegation of Function.
14. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1)(2) (1986).
15. See Larson, What Disabilities Are Protected Under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973?, 16 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 229, 234 n.13 (1986).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. 1987).
17. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1986):
"Handicapped individual" means any person who (1) has a physical or mental
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on Handicapped Employees which, among other responsibilities, reviews
the adequacy of hiring, placement, and advancement of disabled persons
in each department, agency or instrumentality of the federal govern-
ment. 'I
Courts have constructed general approaches for determining whether
a protectable impairment exists. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall9 was a
section 793 action in which the court adopted the Webster's Third
International Dictionary's definition of impairment and thus concluded
the term includes "any condition which weakens, diminishes, restricts
or otherwise damages an individual's health or physical or mental ac-
tivity." ' 20 The United States Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau
County, Florida v. Arline2' relied upon Department of Health and
Human Services regulations to define "impairment" in a section 794
action. 22 Those regulations explain that the term includes "such diseases
and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments,
cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer,
heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, [and] emotional illness. ' 23
The opinion added that Health and Human Services considered a broad
interpretation inherent in the statutory definition and that the term should
not be limited to "so-called 'traditional handicaps.' ' 24
Thus the statute, regulations and case law do provide guidance for
determining the meaning of impairment. However, there remains a great
deal of uncertainty in the complex area of mental impairments. This
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (2) has a record of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having
such an impairment. For purposes of this part, a handicapped individual is
"substantially limited" if he or she is likely to experience difficulty securing,
retaining, or advancing in employment because of a handicap.
Appendix A: Guidelines on the Application of the Definition of the Handicapped
Individual
"Life activities" may be considered to include communication, ambulation,
selfcare, socialization, education, vocational training, employment, transporta-
tion, adapting to housing, etc. For the purpose of section 503 of the Act [§
793], primary attention is given to those life activities that affect employability.
The phrase "substantially limits" means the degree that the impairment affects
employability. The handicapped individual who is likely to experience difficulty
in securing, retaining or advancing in employment would be considered sub-
stantially limited.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. 1987).
19. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980).
20. Id. at 1094, 1097.
21. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
22. Id. at 1127.
23. Id. at n.5.
24. Id.
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uncertainty is in part a function of the difficulty in defining and clas-
sifying mental impairments.
THE STATE OF THE ART
Mental impairments are defined in the Justice Department regulations
for section 794, for example, as "any mental or psychological disorder,
such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities." 25 The substantial number of
people included within this and similar definitions mandates that great
care must be taken in applying the statutory term "impairment." It is
estimated that 20% of the population is affected by diagnosable psy-
chiatric disorders. 26 More than 5% suffer generalized anxiety; 5-10% are
troubled by severe personality disorders; 5-10% suffer from affective
disorders; 15% will suffer an episode of severe depression in their
lifetime; and 1% develop schizophrenia. 27 Current expenditures for men-
tal disorders exceed $20 billion and, if addictive disorders and alcoholism
are included, the economic cost to society exceeds $185 billion per year.2"
Psychiatry will receive most of the attention in this article. The
psychiatrist is a physician and the traditional dominant actor in the
mental health field. Psychiatrists do not have a monopoly in this area,
however. In ambulatory mental health care, psychiatrists account for
only one-third of all visits; psychologists for another third, and non-
psychiatric physicians and non-medical providers for the final third. 29 A
brief look at the interaction between psychiatry and psychology provides
a clear indication of the difficulty of arriving at a consensus regarding
a reliable identification system for mental impairments.30
Each discipline publishes its own professional journals, and the Amer-
ican Psychologist offers an assessment of the relationship between psychiatry
and psychology." Professional identities differ in that psychologists'
training in research and personality imparts a tolerance for ambiguity
25. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
26. Lehmann, The Future of Psychiatry: Progress-Mutation-or Self Destruct, 31
Can. J. Psychiatry 362, 366 (1986), citing Klerman, The Psychiatric Revolution of the
Past Twenty-Five Years, Deviance and Mental Illness 177-96 (W. Grace ed. 1982).
27. Lehmann, supra note 26, at 366.
28. Id., citing J. Nemiah, Research on Mental Illness and Addictive Disorders: the
Magnitude of the Problem, Overview, 142 Am. J. Psychiatry 10-12 (July supp. 1985).
29. Lehmann, supra note 26, at 365.
30. See generally Persons, The Advantages of Studying Psychological Phenomena
Rather Than Psychiatric Diagnoses, 41 Am. Psychologist 1252 (1986) (certain psychological
processes such as delusions and hallucinations will be better understood if the phenomena
themselves are studied directly rather than diagnostic categories).
31. Berg, Toward a Diagnostic Alliance Between Psychiatrist and Psychologist, 41
Am. Psychologist 52 (1986).
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and a predilection for abstraction that can approach obsession. Psy-
chiatrists gravitate toward more concrete and pragmatic approaches and
may find psychologists' test reports unclear and weighted down by
technical jargon.3 2 Medicine's epistemology "is shaped by atomistic,
mechanical, nonintentional and objective constructs in contrast to the
specific, purposive, wholistic, and intentional approach of psychology."
3
Psychiatry's "former" dominance of the mental health field fans a
distrust that includes the fear of a "land grab" by other disciplines,
skepticism towards emerging professions' new techniques, and a growing
concern with exclusion."
Psychologists' collaborations with psychiatrists may be influenced by
the psychologist's envy of higher status and higher earnings and, as a
result, the psychologist may project a sense of assurance that obscures
acknowledged ambiguities. 5 The psychologist may overvalue his or her
diagnostic contribution as a compensation for perceived limits on pro-
fessional opportunities and as a response to criticism.3 6 An editorial in
Psychological Medicine adds that psychiatrists' current education in psy-
chology often reflects "the days when psychologists were regarded as
backroom technicians, analogous to haematologists or biochemists, except
that they forgot, or worse refused, to wear their white coats."37 Psy-
chiatrists may learn about intelligence and memory testing, neuropsy-
chological and personality assessment, and behavior and cognitive therapy,
yet may not be trained in skills and techniques.3 Consequently, psy-
chologists' conclusions may go unheeded.
Even if there is only some truth to this description, there will be
consequences. Diagnostic collaboration is one interface where the shock
waves are felt and certain attitudes "can fuel an interdisciplinary skirmish
in which professional ambitions are frustrated and the patient's welfare
is undermined. 39
The impact of such interdisciplinary squabbling on the search for
a reliable diagnostic system need not be explained. Furthermore, it must
be kept in mind that psychiatry is not being challenged and influenced
by psychology alone. The boundary between behavior and biology is
32. Id. at 53.
33. Id., citing S. Hunt, The Relationship Between Psychology and Medicine, 8 Soc.
Sci. & Med. 105 (1974).
34. Berg, supra note 31, at 54.
35. Id. at 56.
36. Id.
37. Kopelman, Psychiatrist's Education in Psychology: Jackdaw or Sponge, 16 Psy-
chological Med. 13, 14 (1986).
38. Id.
39. Berg, supra note 31, at 54, 57.
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shifting as neuroscientists research the biological determinants of be-
havior. Neuroscientific discoveries may strengthen psychiatry and in-
creasingly require the mental health field to develop expertise that combines
psychological and biological knowledge in order both to understand the
use of psychopharmacological agents and to treat patients." One critic
asserts, however, that psychiatrists' shortcoming is that they do not look
enough like doctors and that they respond by claiming either that they
are neurologists or that psychotherapy is a bona fide medical treatment
for bona fide medical diseases.4 ' Such claims may not be accepted as
valid much longer by the medical, legal, political and scientific authorities
of society. 42
In light of the competing forces in the mental health field and new
research developments, one might narrow the discussion and ask whether
psychiatrists can at least agree among themselves as to the presence and
nature of mental impairments. This question, however, should not be
asked in the abstract. The cases reveal that many courts appear to be
directing attention to whether the claimant can produce a recognized
psychiatric diagnosis. Because courts are requesting such evidence, the
following discussion will address psychiatrists' ability to make consistent
and reliable diagnoses. The discussion following the examination of
judicial cases, however, asks whether a specific diagnosis should be
required. It may be that for determining the existence of a recognizable
impairment a formal diagnosis is not necessary. For the moment, how-
ever, consider psychiatry and its diagnostic approach.
Psychiatric epidemiology did not begin to emerge until the 1920s. 43
Although nineteenth century psychiatrists were avid data collectors, they
were not epidemiologists. They used statistics to demonstrate high cur-
ability rates (defined as the ability to resume life in the community)
but did not relate recovery to etiology or diagnoses.' The status of
psychiatric nosology inhibited epidemiological inquiry in that statistics
dealt not with incidence but with admission to hospitals.45
The adoption of a formal nosology was a controversial issue, and
in 1919 Dr. Adolf Meyer of Johns Hopkins, one of the prominent
leaders in the field, declared that statistics "will be most valuable if
they do not attempt to solve all of the problems of administration and
40. Pardes, Neuroscience and Psychiatry: Marriage or Coexistence?, 143 Am. J.
Psychiatry 1205, 1210 (1986).
41. Szasz, Psychiatry: Rhetoric and Reality, Lancet, Sept. 28, 1985, at 711.
42. Id.
43. Grob, The Origins of American Psychiatric Epidemiology, 75 Am. J. Public
Health 229 (1985).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 230.
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psychiatry and sociology under one confused effort of a one-word di-
agnosis marking the individual. ' 46 Yet in 1920 the Census Bureau,
conceding its inability to draw clear lines, compiled a nomenclature of
diseases that included psychiatric illnesses.47 Psychiatric nosologies, with
few exceptions, rested upon descriptive rather than etiological founda-
tions. Thus the results of epidemiological studies differed because of
variations in both the design of studies and classification of systems as
well as the subjective observations themselves. 4 As late as 1970 a chair-
person at the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health
would praise population surveys of incidence because they substitute
more accurate "operational definitions of mental illness" (i.e., symptom
patterns) for the "often ill-defined syndromes" used by psychiatrists. 49
Great amounts of energy have been devoted to designing diagnostic
classification systems that minimize uncertainty and ambiguity. The World
Health Organization's official International Classification of Diseases,
Injuries and Causes of Death (ICD) and the American Psychiatric As-
sociation's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)
are the most widely recognized.50 DSM-III was designed in the United
States as a national system and will be our specific focus. It utilizes
diagnostic criteria within a multiaxial framework.
DSM-III has received generally favorable reviews. For example, a
survey of one hundred and seventy-five diagnostic experts from fifty-
two countries spanning the six World Health Organization Regions5
revealed that 77076 of them used ICD-9 and 72076 used DSM-III 2 2 How-
ever, on a scale measuring "high, medium and low" usefulness, DSM-
III was rated as highly useful (4607o) more frequently than ICD-9 (290o). 53
A Norwegian study involved a two-hour general introductory course to
DSM-III followed by a case study classification exercise wherein clinicians
diagnosed depressive disorders under both DSM-III and the commonly
46. Id. at 233.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 235.
49. Id. at 236.
50. World Health Organization, Manual of the International Classification of Diseases,
Injuries, and Causes of Death (9th revision 1977); American Psychiatric Association,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1980). These publications
will be referred to by their acronyms and revision numbers, for example, as DSM-III.
Additionally, there were at least fifteen specific multiaxial systems alone from ten
different countries published between 1947 and 1984. Mezzich, et. al., International Ex-
perience with DSM-III, 173 J. Nerv. & Ment. Disease 738 (1985).
51. Mezzich, supra note 50, at 739. (39 from the Americas, 59 from Europe, 15
from Africa, 13 from the Eastern Mediterranean, 38 from South and East Asia, and 11
from the Western Pacific).
52. Id. at 739.
53. Id.
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used ICD-8 system.14 Although there was only a small group of par-
ticipants, the study alludes to similar experiences with over three hundred
mental health professionals and suggests that the DSM-III system results
in a higher percentage of diagnostic agreement than the ICD-8 system. 51
Yet DSM-III, which is being replaced by a fourth edition, is a
frequent subject of commentary and criticism. Its five separate axes are
not perceived to be of equal value. For example, detailed criticisms have
been directed at axis V'6 (the highest level of adaptive functioning in
the past year) and axis II 7 (personality disorder criteria). It has been
asserted that the "abuse" and "dependence" distinction for Substance
Use Disorders does not carry any substantial prognostic implications, 8
and major revisions have been recommended for that diagnosis. 9 DSM-
III diagnoses differ depending upon who is applying the criteria. The
Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS) is a highly structured, standardized
interview designed to allow lay examiners to survey the general population
for mental disorders and, with the assistance of a DSM-III computer
program, to arrive at diagnoses comparable to those a psychiatrist would
obtain. The difficulty of applying diagnostic criteria consistently is il-
lustrated by a Baltimore survey which found only a very low to modest
concordance when eight hundred and twelve subjects were diagnosed by
both the lay DIS method and by psychiatrists. 60
54. Malt, Teaching DSM-III to Clinicians, 73 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 68, 69
(1986).
55. Id. at 72.
56. Fernando, et. al., The Reliability of Axis V of DSM-III, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry
752 (1986) (questioning the prognostic significance of axis V as well as the reliability of
ratings).
57. Widiger et. al., The DSM-III Personality Disorders, 42 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry
615 (1985). The authors assert that while the categorical system used may be simpler and
easier to employ, such a system is inappropriate in light of the inherent complexity
involved in classifying multiple and overlapping maladaptive personality traits. Diagnostic
reliability would be increased if a dimensional model were substituted. This would allow
a clinician to rate patients on a number of dimensions rather than having to select among
a number of alternative categories. Id. at 619. See also, Livesley, The Classification of
Personality Disorder: II. The Problem of Diagnostic Criteria, 30 Can. J. Psychiatry 359
(1985).
58. Schuckit, et. al., Clinical Implications of DSM-III Diagnoses of Alcohol Abuse
and Alcohol Dependence, 142 Am. J. Psychiatry 1403, 1408 (1985).
59. Rounsaville, et. al., Proposed Changes in DSM-III Substance Use Disorders:
Description and Rationale, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry 463 (1986).
60. Anthony, et. al., Comparison of the Lay Diagnostic Interview Schedule and a
Standardized Psychiatric Diagnosis, 43 Gen. Arch. Psychiatry 667, 671 (1985). See also,
Spitzer, Psychiatric Diagnosis: Are Clinicians Still Necessary, 24 Comprehensive Psychiatry
399 (1983) (introducing an alternative structured interview entitled Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-II (SCID) which, unlike DIS, is designed to allow for greater flexibility
in the interview by taking advantage of the strengths of traditional clinical diagnostic
interviews. Id. at 402).
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Diagnostic difficulties go beyond DSM-III. One less obvious problem
is the distribution of information regarding new developments. Know-
ledge is advancing too rapidly for anyone to have personal experience
with all the findings, and physicians are increasingly dependent upon
medical journals. A survey of fifteen major psychiatric journals reveals
that readers must be familiar with about a dozen statistical techniques
to understand approximately 95% of the quantitative methods contained
in the articles reviewed. 6' That survey's conclusion includes a call to
practitioners to improve their quantitative skills. The unspoken assump-
tion is that not all practitioners have the ability to stay abreast of
developments. An additional concern is that patients' falsification of
psychiatric history can assume various forms which affect the clinical
psychiatric diagnosis. 62
All of this merely hints at the complexity surrounding the field of
mental health. This article will next examine how courts are responding
to this complexity.
MENTAL IMPAIRMENTs RECOGNIZED As PROTECTED
Although there have not been a great number of cases considering
which mental disorders qualify as statutory impairments, certain cases
do provide some guidance. Doe v. New York University63 involved a
medical student who filed an action seeking readmission to medical
school under section 794. The plaintiff was described as an individual
suffering for many years from serious psychiatric and mental disorders,
which manifested themselves in the form of numerous self-destructive
acts and attacks upon others. Her actions included an overdose with
sleeping pills when she was fourteen years old, self-injection with a
powerful cancer drug, plunging a kitchen knife into her stomach, re-
peatedly severing arteries and veins, self-injection with cyanide, and
repeatedly physically and aggressively attacking physicians with her teeth
61. Hokanson, et. al., Spectrum and Frequency of Use of Statistical Techniques in
Psychiatric Journals, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry 1118, 1122 (1986) (the statistical procedures
identified are descriptive statistics, dispersion, chi-square, epidemiological statistics, t test,
Pearson product-moment correlation and nonparametric correlation, nonparametric tests,
simple and multiple linear regression, ANOVA, survival analysis, transformations, and
mathematical models). See also, Edlund, et. al., Beta, or Type 11 Error in Psychiatric
Controlled Clinical Trials, 19 J. Psychiat. Res. 563, 566 (1985) (asserting that psychiatric
clinical studies themselves may be misleading in that Type II or Beta errors (the probability
of failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is in fact false) may go unreported because
medical literature is highly biased towards reporting positive, as opposed to negative,
results).
62. See, Kerns, Falsifications in the Psychiatric History: A Differential Diagnosis, 49
Psychiatry, Feb. 1986 13-17.
63. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
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and fingernails, as well as with potentially lethal objects such as scissors. 6
However, over the course of her academic career she excelled, and she
also received excellent employment evaluations. 65
In spite of her substantial medical history, described in detail by
the court, 66 Doe applied to medical school and falsely represented that
she did not have then and had never had any chronic or recurrent
illnesses or emotional problems. She was accepted at New York Uni-
versity Medical School and, during a mandatory medical examination,
revealed her psychiatric history. At a later examination Dr. Stern, an
associate dean, concluded that Doe had a "fragile personality" and sent
her for psychological tests. 67 The psychologist noted that she had a
"grossly detached and alienated personality, with no effective intellectual
or emotional contact with the world of things or people." ' 68 Doe even-
tually made a written proposal for a leave of absence which was granted
on the understanding that she could request possible reinstatement.
After a subsequent hospitalization, her condition on discharge was
listed as "no improvement" with a diagnosis of "Borderline Personality
. . . Personality Disorders, other specified types 301.89. ' '69 The person-
ality disorder classified as "Borderline Personality" is a serious con-
dition, manifesting itself by a series of five or more recognizable
characteristics, according to the DSM-III. 70 A person suffering from this
condition is likely to have it continue through most of her adult life,
subject to modification only by treatment over a period of years and
adoption of a life style which avoids situations which subject the person
to types of stress with which she cannot cope. 71
Doe later applied for readmission and claimed that she was a hand-
icapped person under the Act. This assertion conflicted with her repre-
sentations on the medical school applications that she did not suffer
from any emotional problems. It also conflicted with her own testimony
that her ability to function in major life activities had never been
impaired and that she had never been unable to work or learn. She
had successfully graduated from college, had received a masters degree
from Harvard, and had established an outstanding employment record
as a member of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 72
64. Id. at 766.
65. Id. at 770.
66. Id. at 766-70.
67. Id. at 767.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id., citing American Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1980).
72. Id. at 775.
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Additionally, an Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard Med-
ical School, who was the superior of one of the psychiatrists who
diagnosed Doe as suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder, dis-
agreed with that diagnosis and stated that Doe had a "'chronic neurotic
depression' that was a 'treatable condition."' 23 The court concluded:
Notwithstanding this evidence we believe that for present pur-
poses she should be classified as a handicapped person under
the Act, in view of the independent evidence of her extensive
history of mental impairments requiring hospitalizations and her
departure from NYU in 1976 because of psychiatric problems,
all of which indicate that she has suffered from a substantial
limitation on a major life activity, the ability to handle stressful
situations of the type faced in a medical training milieu. 74
The court was thus convinced not only that she had experienced a
mental disorder sufficiently severe to be recognized as an impairment
under the Rehabilitation Act, but also that this impairment had been
a substantial limitation on a major life activity. The court stated that
its conclusion was reinforced by the wide scope of the definition in
section 706(7)(B), 71 which includes in subdivision (ii) anyone with a
"record.of such impairment," as well as by the Rehabilitation Act's
legislative history, "which indicates that the definition is not to be
construed in a niggardly fashion. '"7 6
The Doe court recognized plaintiff as protected because she was
"regarded as having such [a protected] impairment" and also because
she had "a record of such impairment." ' 77 Implicit in the observation
about her medical record is the recognition that plaintiff's psychiatric
problems were severe enough to warrant protection under the Act. With
this kind of history it was not difficult for the court to identify a
protected handicap. There have been other relatively straightforward
cases.
Blackwell v. United States Department of Treasury78 is a succinct
two-page opinion that demonstrates the weight accorded a psychiatric
diagnosis. Plaintiff contended that interviewing officials conspired to
eliminate a job opening because plaintiff was a transvestite whom they
regarded as being mentally ill. 79 Defendants argued that plaintiff did
73. Id. at 769. This psychiatrist did, however, acknowledge the possibility of a
recurrence as well as the existence of other personality disorders. Id. at 778.
74. Id. at 775.
75. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for the definition.
76. 666 F.2d at 775.
77. Id.
78. 639 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1986).
79. Id. at 290, citing Plaintiff's Complaint, para. 15.
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not state a claim for relief under the Rehabilitation Act because a
transvestite is not a handicapped person under the Act. The court
considered the case from the perspective of a plaintiff alleging he was
regarded as having a handicap.
The Department of the Treasury acknowledges that transvestitism
is recognized by the American Psychiatric Association as a men-
tal disorder. Plaintiff has alleged that the position he sought
was eliminated because Treasury officials regarded the fact that
he is a transvestite as a handicap. This is enough to state a
claim under the Rehabilitation Act.8 0
There have been cases, however, where the existence of an impairment
was not as apparent. In Forrisi v. Bowen,81 the employer terminated an
employee suffering from acrophobia. During an introductory tour of
the plant, Forrisi told his supervisor that he could not climb to certain
heights. When management officials responded that it appeared he would
not be able to satisfy the job requirements of utility systems repairer,
which included climbing stairs and ladders, Forrisi insisted that he could
do the necessary work. Approximately two months after Forrisi was
hired, he was discharged because he was found 'medically unable to
perform the full range of the duties of [his] position.""'
In his testimony Forrisi reported that his fear of heights never
affected his life and that it was never a problem before he obtained
his current position. By his admission, Forrisi established that he would
not be pursuing his claim based upon an assertion of discrimination
against a current handicap. Instead, Forrisi argued that although he was
not in fact a handicapped individual, he was perceived as being limited
in one of his major life activities.83
The diagnosis of Forrisi's condition was sufficient evidence to result
in an apparent concession that there was a recognizable mental im-
pairment and the case focused on subsequent burdens of proof. More
80, Id. See also Blackwell v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 656 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D.D.C.
1986), where the court stated: "Yet, as a matter of statutory analysis, while homosexuals
are not handicapped it is clear that transvestites are, because many experience strong
social rejection in the work place as a result of their mental ailment made blatantly
apparent by their cross-dressing life-style." Id. at 715.
Although the district court opinion was vacated by the District of Columbia Circuit,
the appellate decision addressed the specificity of notice of an impairment that must be
provided to an employer. The appeals court agreed with the district court's conclusion
that sexual orientation or preference is not protected but did not comment on the lower
court's conclusion that transvestism is a distinguishable, protectable condition. Blackwell
v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 830 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
81. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 933.
83. Id. at 934.
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specifically, it was not disputed that the perception that an employee
has acrophobia might result in protection under the Act. This condition
is a recognizable mental impairment. It will only be protected, however,
if the plaintiff can establish the additional proof requirements of a
substantial limitation on a major life activity. It is in regard to these
burdens of proof that Forissi failed.
When a government agency establishes a percentage disability in
connection with government service, one might presume that this ac-
know.ledgement of a disability would later be recognized by the courts.
A plaintiff dismissed because of excessive unscheduled absences asserted
a disability resulting from diabetes and mental illness in Wimbley v.
Bolger." The court declared that it was undisputed that plaintiff had
a thirty percent service-connected disability established by the Veterans
Administration standards. It further stated, however, that this did not
automatically render him a handicapped employee for purposes of the
Rehabilitation Act.8" The Wimbley court did not further discuss what
percentage would be necessary to establish a protected disability, but
instead determined that this plaintiff was afflicted with a sufficient
disability to bring him within the definition of a handicapped employee.
The court was perhaps willing to make this determination because it
then resolved the case by determining that even if the plaintiff was
handicapped, he was not "qualified. ' '8 6
The Wimbley case is worth discussing because that court adopted
an approach that appears in several cases. Wimbley's discharge was
judged permissible because he was not terminated due to a mental illness.
Rather, he was terminated due to his failure to come to work. The
court stated that an employee who does not come to work cannot
perform any of his job functions, and thus cannot be a qualified
handicapped employee.17 Several interesting questions are thus raised. Is
it appropriate to deny a plaintiff protection by distinguishing between
manifestations of a protected impairment and the impairment itself?
Furthermore, if such distinctions are to be drawn, how should they be
integrated into the Rehabilitation Act analysis?
WHERE DOES A DISABILITY END AND INDEPENDENT CONDUCT BEGIN?
In Swann v. Walters,"8 an employee was demoted from a shift
supervisor position with access to confidential medical information to
84. 642 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
85. Id. at 485.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 620 F. Supp. 741 (D.D.C. 1984).
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the position of housekeeping aide. The demotion was a result of plain-
tiff's conviction on a felony charge of sexual child abuse in a Maryland
state court. As a result of the conviction and in accordance with Federal
Personnel Manual Guidelines, plaintiff lost his security clearance and
could no longer hold his shift supervisor position.
Plaintiff asserted a Rehabilitation Act claim, alleging his demotion
was due to a mental disability based upon a chronic condition of
paranoid schizophrenia. 9 The court concluded that plaintiff could not
sustain his Rehabilitation Act claim because he was not demoted ".solely
because of his handicap." 9° Rather, the Veterans Administration acted
based not upon any impairment but rather upon plaintiff's criminal
misconduct which reflected adversely on his trustworthiness and stability.
There was no evidence that plaintiff's psychiatric condition was taken
into account. 91 Further, the court considered the plaintiff's claim as an
attempt to use his schizophrenia as a basis for exempting himself from
a critical criterion of his job, the security clearance. The court stated
that this was not within the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act, which
was intended to insure that handicapped individuals are not excluded
when they can meet the essential prerequisites of a job. 92
The court cited a third reason in support of its decision not to
protect plaintiff. The Rehabilitation Act requires that claimants be "oth-
erwise qualified." In other words, according to the United States Su-
preme Court's interpretation in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis,93 an individual must be able to meet all of the job requirements
"in spite of" his handicap. 94 Plaintiff's criminal misconduct made him
unsuitable to hold the security clearance, which was a fundamental
requirement of his position.
The first reason discussed is particularly interesting. Based upon the
absence of any evidence that plaintiff's psychiatric condition was a
consideration, the court concluded that the Veterans Administration acted
appropriately. Yet there is a clear suggestion that plaintiff's criminal
misconduct was a function of his psychiatric condition. A defendant
should not be able to avoid the Rehabilitation Act merely by focusing
upon an individual's conduct rather than his mental impairment. The
Swann court's third justification, which addresses the issue of qualifi-
cation and which was also relied upon by the Wimbley court, represents
the proper approach.
89. Id. at 746.
90. Id. at 747.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 442 U.S. 397, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979).
94. 620 F. Supp. at 747, citing 442 U.S. at 406.
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This issue is not as obscure as it may appear. Guerriero v. Schultz95
involved a foreign service officer dismissed as a result of certain off-
duty conduct. It was stipulated that while in Uruguay, Guerriero engaged
in public sex acts with three or four local prostitutes. 96 It was undisputed
that Guerriero had been drinking at the time. Guerriero claimed that
his termination constituted unlawful discrimination because the dismissal
was based upon "handicaps" which may have contributed to the conduct
in question. Guerriero suffered from acute alcohol addiction and a
schizoid personality disorder first diagnosed following his return from
Uruguay but which nevertheless had existed for years. 97
Guerriero alleged that he had joined Alcoholics Anonymous, that
he was abstaining from alcohol, and that his psychological disorders
were in remission. He alleged that those psychological disorders, however,
rendered him a handicapped individual within the meaning of the Re-
habilitation Act and that those deficiencies could not be used as the
basis for adverse personnel actions if he was otherwise qualified and his
handicaps could be accommodated.9 8
The court accepted that either his schizoid personality disorder or
his alcoholism could be regarded as handicaps within the meaning of
the Act. 99 The court concluded, however, that Guerriero's dismissal was
not based upon any mental disorder but was a result of his conduct.
This conduct was of such an 'immoral, notoriously disgraceful, and
prejudicial' character as to have compromised his ability to represent
the United States abroad."' 1 The Board of Foreign Service, which
recommended Guerriero's dismissal, proceeded upon the determination
that Guerriero was not an alcoholic. Although this may have been error,
the court concluded that this actually supported the Board's position
upon appeal. The Rehabilitation Act only prohibits discrimination against
an individual because he or she has a handicap such as alcoholism.
Because plaintiff's alleged disabilities were accorded no particular sig-
nificance one way or another in the Board's determination, no violation
existed.
Guerriero drew a distinction between the existence of an impairment
and conduct which may have been a product of the impairment. This
approach can lead to an extremely restrictive reading of the Rehabilitation
Act. Interpreted in this manner, the Act arguably only protects against
discrimination based upon the label of a particular mental impairment
95. 557 F. Supp. 511 (D.D.C. 1983).
96. Id. at 512 n.2.
97. Id. at 512.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 513.
100. Id.
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but does not protect against discrimination towards any of the mani-
festations of that impairment. Additionally, as will be developed, such
a practice denies the full protection intended by the Rehabilitation Act.
A similar analysis was provided in Richardson v. United States Postal
Service.10' Richardson was suspended from his job when, after attempting
to kill his wife and himself, he was charged with assault with intent to
kill. He was diagnosed as suffering from deep depression with paranoid
tendency and alcoholism. He eventually pled guilty to assault and weap-
ons charges and was thereafter terminated. 0
2
The only claim considered by the district court was whether the
Postal Service failed to accommodate Richardson's alcoholism handicap.
The court concluded that even if Richardson's mental difficulties and
alcohol use could be untangled and his alcoholism could be shown to
be a substantial cause of his criminal conduct, it would not benefit
Richardson. Richardson was discharged for criminal conduct, not because
of alcoholism or poor job performance due to alcohol. The court stated
that the Rehabilitation Act "does not prohibit an employer from dis-
charging an employee for improper off-duty conduct when the reason
for the discharge is the conduct itself, and not any handicap to which
the conduct may be related."'0 3
This opinion, however, contains some provocative language. The
court states that the Rehabilitation Act does not create a duty to ac-
commodate an alcoholic who "commits an act which, standing alone,
disqualifies the alcoholic from service and which is not entirely a man-
ifestation of alcohol abuse."' ° The court thus recognizes that there may
be a connection between alcohol abuse and conduct. Accordingly, the
critical inquiry must determine what conduct would be entirely a man-
ifestation of alcohol abuse. Once a court recognizes that there is a
connection between an impairment that is presumably provided protection
and the conduct manifested by that protected impairment, the perception
of what is protected according to the Rehabilitation Act may have to
be substantially altered.
But what about the safety of other persons? Should someone who
has committed assault with intent to kill receive protected status with
federal contractors, in federally assisted programs, and in the federal
government? Safety concerns can be taken into account without per-
verting the handicap analysis. The effects of a disorder cannot be re-
alistically distinguished from the disorder itself. Safety risks are properly
101. 613 F. Supp. 1213 (D.D.C. 1985).
102. Id. at 1214.
103. Id. at 1215-16.
104. Id. at 1216 (emphasis added).
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considered at a subsequent stage in the analytic model, when determining
qualifications for the position. For instance, the regulations interpreting
section 791 (concerning the federal government as employer) define a
qualified handicapped person as someone who "with or without rea-
sonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
position in question without endangering the health and safety of the
individual or others."105 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals established
in Mantolete v. Bolger,1°6 a case involving a successful plaintiff with
epilepsy who had applied for a job involving heavy machinery, that an
employer cannot reject an applicant without showing "reasonable prob-
ability of substantial harm."' 1 7 If a defendant can distinguish conduct
possibly resulting from an impairment from the impairment itself at the
initial definitional stage, burdens that a defendant should be required
to satisfy will be improperly circumvented.
STATE STATUTORY LANGUAGE THAT RESEMBLES THE FEDERAL
REHABILTATION ACT
School District of Philadelphia v. Friedman'0 was decided pursuant
to Pennsylvania state statutes, but is of interest because the statutes
relied upon provide protections which resemble those available under
the federal Rehabilitation Act. The lawsuit was brought pursuant to
section 5 of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,' °9 which makes it
an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to refuse to hire
or to discharge anyone because of a non-job related handicap or dis-
ability." 0 The Pennsylvania Code, Title 16, section 44.4"' defines "hand-
icapped or disabled person" as:
(i) A person who:
(a) has a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities;
(b) has a record of such an impairment; or
(c) is regarded as having such an impairment.
(ii) As used in subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, the phrase:
(a) ". . . mental impairment" means a physiological dis-
order or condition . . . a mental or psychological dis-
105. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1987).
106. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
107. Id. at 1422.
108. 507 A.2d 882 (Pa. Commw. 1986).
109. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act § 5(a), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 955(a) (Purdon
Supp. 1987).
110. Id.
111. 16 Pa. Code § 44.4.
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order, such as mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.
(b) "Major life activities" means the functions such as
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing. 112
Friedman was a computer programmer trainee who was discharged
for chronic lateness. He alleged that the school district had discriminated
against him because of his mental disability, a personality disorder which
results in chronic lateness, which he in turn claimed was not job-
related. 113
In the Court of Commons Pleas the chancellor had found that the
school district's physician diagnosed Friedman's condition as a "neurotic
compulsion for lateness" and that the school district had received from
Friedman's treating physician of ten years a letter which labeled Fried-
man's chronic lateness as a "behavioral aberration.""1 4 The chancellor
also found that Friedman had been treated by a clinical psychologist
trained in behavioral modification therapy. Based upon this evidence
the chancellor concluded that Friedman suffered from, and continued
to suffer from, a mental disability. As a result of this disability he was
chronically late for virtually all of his life activities, including reporting
for work." 5
The record included a letter from Dr. Mock, Friedman's treating
physician of ten years. That letter contained the following information
regarding Friedman's condition:
It seems to be a rather infantile and certainly self-defeating way
of rebelliously asserting his individuality and of refusing to
submit to the rules set down by authority. Although I recognize
that his lateness is disruptive to an organization that includes
a uniform work schedule in its structure, it is a comparatively
benign expression of his determination not to be obliterated by
a dominating controlling system of which he conceives himself
as a victim. I would like to emphasize an obvious fact, namely
that his motivation and rationale for this behavior is almost
completely unconscious and literally beyond his control .... It
is extremely questionable whether this deeply engrained behav-
ioral pattern will ever be modified by means of psychiatric
intervention. 16
112. Id.
113. 507 A.2d at 883.
114. Id. at 884.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 885.
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The chancellor at the trial had asked Dr. Mock to categorize Mr.
Friedman's condition. Dr. Mock declined to do so, stating that there
was no specific diagnostic label that could be used. ' 7 Dr. Mock did
state that the plaintiff was not psychotic. Additionally, when asked
whether Friedman was neurotic, Dr. Mock did not answer either affir-
matively or negatively but simply responded "personality disorder."1 8
Dr. Mock did agree that what he had termed a personality disorder
existed around us everyday in all walks of life. Finally, Dr. Mock
admitted that Friedman's condition did not impair his ability to care
for himself, to walk, see, hear, speak, learn or work." 9 In light of that
observation and in response to Dr. Mock's diagnostic evasiveness, the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed and declared that the record
was clear that Mr. Friedman had no disability as that term is defined
by Pennsylvania law.1
20
A dissenting opinion stressed the fact that Friedman had submitted
to an examination by a school physician who had diagnosed his condition
as a "neurotic compulsion for lateness."'' The dissent further empha-
sized that, according to Dr. Mock, plaintiff's motivation and rationale
for his behavior were almost completely unconscious and literally beyond
his control. Mr. Friedman had received psychiatric treatment since he
was a teenager. He had been honorably discharged on account of a
non-service connected disability, psychiatric in nature. He had received
psychiatric treatment as an inpatient at Philadelphia General Hospital
in 1964 and had subsequently attended Horizon House (a social service
agency serving former mental patients). Friedman had been treated for
many years by Dr. Mock, a psychiatrist, and for a shorter period by
a Dr. Jasin, a clinical psychologist. In fact, Mr. Friedman had been
referred to the school district for employment by Horizon House, and
two Horizon House counselors had accompanied him to the school
board administration building for his interview. The dissent concluded
that Friedman's mental impairment substantially limited one or more of
his major life activities and that his persistent lateness manifested itself
in all situations, not just employment. 22 His disability was not job-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 885-86.
121. Id. at 891.
122. Id. at 891. Recall that the court specifically noted that, when asked whether
Friedman was neurotic, Dr. Mock responded "personality disorder." See supra text
accompanying note 118. There is a category of mental disorders included in DSM-III that
is grouped under the title "personality disorders." The court should have considered it
sufficient to identify the category of this particularly complex disorder and concentrated
its attention on other elements of plaintiff's proof.
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related because it did not substantially interfere with his ability to
perform the essential functions of the job.
It is difficult to draw any clear conclusions from School District of
Philadelphia v. Friedman. The majority stated simply that the record
supported a conclusion of no disability as the term was defined by
regulation. 23 The regulation, however, includes definitions of both mental
impairment and major life activities. The majority probably rested its
decision upon the finding that there was no limitation of a major life
activity. The evasiveness of Dr. Mock and the absence of a specific
diagnostic label beyond the identification of a general class of disorders,
however, appears to have been of importance and suggests that the
court questioned whether an impairment existed. There is a significant
degree of uncertainty surrounding the labeling of psychiatric disorders.
The fact that Dr. Mock was able to identify a class of disorders that
applies to the plaintiff, but did not go further and provide a specific
diagnosis, should not necessarily mean that a protected impairment was
not present. Recall that personality disorders are represented on axis II
of DSM-III and that this axis has been criticized as unclear and lacking
in diagnostic reliability.
24
One can find additional cases interpreting state statutory language
similar to that found in the federal Rehabilitation Act. Sommers v.
Iowa Civil Rights Commission 25 examined whether Iowa law' 26 proscribes
employment discrimination based upon transsexuality.' 27 Sommers, who
referred to herself as "she," claimed to be an individual "anatomically
male but psychologically and emotionally female."' 28 Shortly after being
hired, she was questioned about her sexual status, informed that she
could not use the restrooms, and ultimately discharged. Sommers filed
a complaint alleging she was discriminated against on the basis of a
disability in violation of Iowa Code section 601A.6(l) (1981),29 which
123. Id. at 885-86.
124. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
125. 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983).
126. Iowa Code § 601A.6(l)(a) (1981).
127. Transsexualism differs from homosexuality or transvestism. Homosexuals, ac-
cording to the court, do not suffer from gender identity disturbances as do transsexuals
and transvestites. Homosexuals accept their anatomical structure and the male or female
role, except with regard to their sexual preference. A transvestite represents a status
between the homosexual and the transsexual and obtains satisfaction by dressing in the
clothing of the opposite sex. Citing Doe v. Minnesota Dep't of Public Welfare and
Hennepin County Welfare Bd., 257 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Minn. 1977), the court stated that
transsexualism is irreversible and can only be treated with surgery to remove some of the
transsexual feelings of psychological distress. 337 N.W.2d at 473.
128. 337 N.W.2d at 471.
129. Id. at 471-72.
[Vol. 48
MENTAL IMPAIRMENTS
states: "It shall be an unfair and discriminatory practice for any: a.
Person to ...discharge any employee ...because of age, race, creed,
color, sex, national origin, religion or disability of such ...employee
... 1. )30 Section 601A.2(11) defines "disability" as "the physical or
mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial handicap.
In reference to employment, under this chapter, 'disability' also means
the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a sub-
stantial handicap, but is unrelated to such person's ability to engage in
a particular occupation.""'3 The Iowa Civil Rights Commission rules
further define "substantially handicapped person" and state that mental
impairment means "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities.' ' 13 2
The court stated that the disorders identified in the Commission
rules are inherently likely to have a limiting effect on one or more
major life activities. The court concluded that although transsexualism
may have an adverse effect on a person's capacity to engage in activities
such as learning and working because of the attitudes of other people,
this does not mean that the condition itself meets the definition of
impairment. The court summarized:
An adverse societal attitude does not mean that the transsexual
is necessarily perceived as having a physical or mental impair-
ment. Although a transsexual may have difficulty in obtaining
and retaining employment, the Commission could reasonably
believe that difficulty is the result of discrimination based on
societal beliefs that the transsexual is undesirable, rather than
from beliefs that the transsexual is impaired physically or men-
tally as that term is used in the statute and defined in the rule.
While we do not approve of such discrimination, we do not
believe it is prohibited by the Iowa Civil Rights Act.'33
The Commission's efforts to distinguish Sommers' situation are uncon-
vincing. An employee must generally be able to socialize with co-workers
and managers. 3 4 A significant number of jobs also involve communi-
cating with customers. Many jobs depend upon the ability to interact
with others. If transsexualism interferes with interaction, there is a strong
130. Id. at 472, citing Iowa Code § 601A.6 (1981).
131. Iowa Code § 601A.2(11) (1981).
132. 240 Iowa Admin. Code r. 6.1(2)(b)(1982).
133. 337 N.W.2d at 477.
134. Sommers was hired as a clerical worker and apparently had contact with other
employees because she was first recognized by an acquaintance who was also an employee.
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argument that a substantial interference with the ability to work also
exists and that transsexualism should thus be protected.' 35
Sommers was able to assert a recognized diagnostic label. In other
cases, this has worked to the plaintiff's advantage. In Blackwell v.
United States Department of Treasury,3 6 the court determined that
because transvestitism is recognized by the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation as a mental disorder, a defendant that perceives an employee to
be a transvestite will be held to regard that person as impaired within
the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The reading given the Iowa
statute by the Commission, which was determined to be reasonable by
the Supreme Court of Iowa, was unnecessarily restrictive. Although the
supreme court may have protected Sommer's condition under circum-
stances involving full judicial review, some disorders may be so socially
unattractive that even with a diagnostic label it will be difficult to
establish protected status.
Barnes v. Barbosa'a7 involved a Chicago Transit Authority bus driver
alleging discrimination based upon his mental handicap of carbon mon-
oxide phobia. Before his discharge, plaintiff had been overcome by
carbon monoxide fumes while operating a bus and treated for carbon
monoxide poisoning. Psychiatrist David Brueckner saw the plaintiff at
least eight times after the incident and concluded that plaintiff was
suffering from a "carbon monoxide phobic reaction."' 38 Plaintiff was
also examined by Dr. Arieff, who determined that there was no objective
evidence of any organic disease of the central or peripheral nervous
system or any evidence of outward anxiety except for plaintiff's history.3 9
The plaintiff could return to work whenever he desired, according to
Dr. Arieff.
Although the court decided that plaintiff did have an impairment,
the dissent objected to the majority's primary reliance upon the report
of Dr. Brueckner, which was limited to a single paragraph concluding
that plaintiff was suffering from a carbon monoxide phobic reaction. 40
Dr. Brueckner conducted no independent tests or examinations and made
no findings of any kind to support this impression. Dr. Arieff, on the
other hand, submitted a lengthy, detailed three-page report which stated
135. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text. (School Bd. of Nassau County,
Florida v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, holds that the effects of disease (tuberculosis) on
others cannot be separated from the effect on the patient.)
136. 639 F. Supp. 289, 290 (D.D.C. 1986). See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying
text.
137. 144 Il. App. 3d 860, 494 N.E.2d 619 (1986).
138. 144 I1. App. 3d at 862, 494 N.E.2d at 521.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 866, 494 N.E.2d at 621.
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that the plaintiff could go back to work but that Dr. Arieff did not
believe plaintiff wanted to resume driving buses.
POLICY CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Several conclusions can be drawn from the preceding cases. If a
plaintiff suffers from a mental impairment that has been labeled with
a DSM-III diagnosis, that plaintiff possesses a protected impairment.' 41
The diagnosis itself appears to command great deference concerning the
issue of whether an impairment is sufficiently severe to warrant pro-
tection. There has been little discussion of the degree of impairment
once a diagnosis has been offered in testimony.
The presence or absence of a DSM-III diagnosis, however, should
not be overemphasized. A random survey completed by five hundred
and fifty-seven United States psychiatrists and four hundred and ninety-
eight psychiatric residents indicates that 35076 of the practitioners and
20% of the residents would not continue to use DSM-III if it were not
required. 42 Of particular concern is the fact that about 48o76 of the
psychiatrists' patients and 36% of the residents' patients receiving official
DSM-III diagnoses do not fulfill all the necessary criteria., 43 An earlier
survey found that only one of three hundred and one psychiatrists
surveyed in 1980 was using all the required DSM-III criteria to diagnose
schizophrenia.' 44DSM-III may only be a convenient source of labels for
diagnoses independently determined, and the reliability and validity so
141. But see Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Soc. of W. Cent. Ohio, 625 F. Supp.
1180 (S.D. Ohio 1985), and Pridemore v. Legal Aid Society of Dayton, 625 F. Supp.
1171 (S.D. Ohio 1985), where the court found that plaintiff, an attorney, had a record
of a mental impairment but did not discuss the nature of the impairment or the diagnosis.
In both cases, plaintiff neglected to assert a claim of mental impairment. However, in
the interest of justice, the court considered plaintiff's mental condition on its own initiative.
625 F. Supp. at 1185. Pridemore's condition was not thoroughly discussed because the
impairment issue was not argued and developed by counsel and because of the specific
allegation involved. The court analyzed the case as one alleging a record of an impairment
rather than a present impairment. The court focused upon Pridemore's substantial hospital
record and not the actual condition that led to the hospitalization. The court perhaps
did not fully develop Pridemore's medical history because it had already decided to rule
against Pridemore based upon his failure to establish material facts susceptible to an
inference that he had been rejected solely because of his impairments. Id. at 1186.
142. Jampala, Sierles, and Taylor, Consumers' Views of DSM-III: Attitudes and Prac-
tices of U.S. Psychiatrists and 1984 Graduating Residents, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry 148,
149 (1986).
143. Id. at 151-52.
144. Id. at 152, citing Lipkowitz and Idupuganti, Diagnosing Schizophrenia in 1980:
A Survey of U.S. Psychiatrists, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 52 (1983). The result was similar
in 1982. Jampala, supra note 147, citing Lipkowitz, et. al., Diagnosing Schizophrenia in
1982: the Effect of DSM-III, 142 Am. J. Psychiatry 634 (1985).
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eagerly promoted by its developers may not be reflected in practice. 145
Numerous factors contribute to the decision of whether to include
a particular disorder in DSM-III. The factors are not all scientific.
Affected or interested groups concerned with social stigmas have lobbied
against inclusion. 146 Additionally, there is an undisputed degree of un-
certainty in psychiatry. Between the current third edition of DSM and
the upcoming fourth edition, there have been over two hundred changes
and additions.' 47 As a result of this lack of definiteness, the fourth
edition will provide an appendix which will include specific conditions
too controversial to be included in the main text. 148
In certain instances, the acquisition of a diagnosis may be a result
of chance. If a person has a family support group that assists in the
management of a disability, for instance, that person may not rely on
professional care and may not obtain a diagnosis. If a primary care
practitioner is consulted, she typically under-diagnoses the mental illness,
with magnitudes of error from those omissions reaching fifty to eighty
percent. 49 One study recorded primary care physicians identifying as
depressed only twenty-six percent of new patients so assessed on the
highly structured DIS. 5 ° Additionally, diagnostic consistency is not guar-
anteed. 5 ' An increasing number of providers are entering the mental
health care field. Social workers, psychologists, family counselors and
clergy are joining psychiatrists in the treatment of persons with mental
impairments. The availability of a psychiatric diagnosis sufficient for
introduction into evidence may decline in reverse proportion to the
expanding practices of alternative mental health care practitioners.
145. Jampala, supra note 142, at 152.
146. See, e.g., Psychiatrists Wrangle Over Controversial Diagnoses, American Medical
News, June 6, 1986.
147. Id.
148. APA Reaches Compromise on Diagnoses, American Medical News, July 18, 1986.
One of the conditions that will be listed in the appendix is periluteal phase dysphoric
disorder, which refers to women with "clinically significant emotional and behavioral
symptoms" during most menstrual cycles. Id. The significance of the appendix is unclear.
149. Schulberg, et. al., Psychiatric Decision Making in Family Practice, 8 Gen. Hosp.
Psychiatry 1 (1986). One must keep statistical assertions in proper perspective, however.
There is no absolute standard against which one can make such measurements.
150. Id. at 1, citing Schulberg, Saul, McClelland, Ganguli, Christy, and Frank, As-
sessing Depression in Primary Medical and Psychiatric Practice, 42 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry
1164 (1985).
151. There are numerous examples of experiments similar to the one arranged by D.L.
Rosenham, who planted eight volunteers in psychiatric wards and instructed them to
behave normally. Staff psychiatrists never recognized them as sane. Psychiatry on the
Couch, Time, April 2, 1979, at 74. For an example. of how diagnostic categories can
change and of the impact such revisions can have on the legal system, see Judge Burger's
concurrence in Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 860-61 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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Furthermore, the interrater reliability of two psychiatrists doing in-
dependent examinations of the same individual is less than perfect,"'
proving that at least one of them must have been in error. Pairs of
psychiatrists attempting to apply DSM-III criteria can disagree for at
least two reasons: (1) while criteria may be clearer than they once were,
ambiguities remain and result in different judgments based upon identical
data; and (2) even when testing procedures are completely standardized
a respondent may not reveal symptomatology consistently, which leads
to differences in the information to be evaluated."' The information
required for DWvI-III diagnoses far exceeds the information necessary
for LCD diagnoses. 5 4 The more strictly a clinician adheres to the criteria,
the more time it takes to collect the information. The interviewer is
directed towards details in symptomatology, which may be perceived to
be of limited relevance for therapy."' Clinicians may stop short of
exhausting the diagnostic schedules. Psychotherapists tend to ignore the
manual and rely upon individual psychodynamic formulation to guide
treatment. Although class diagnoses offer some broad guidance in choos-
ing between drug, behavioral, psychotherapeutic or other approaches to
certain disorders, these diagnoses are less helpful when dealing with
personality disorders. 5
6
Psychiatric treatment may be a function of class, race and cultural
background.15 7 There is also strong evidence that these factors influence
152. Helzer, Robins, McEvoy, Spitznagel, Stoltzman, Farmer, and Brockington, A
Comparison of Clinical and Diagnostic Interview Schedule Diagnoses, 42 Arch. Gen.
Psychiatry 657 (1985), citing Spitzer, A Re-analysis of the Reliability of Psychiatric
Diagnosis, 125 Br. J. Psychiatry 341 (1974).
153. Helzer, supra note 152, at 665. For a discussion of the Diagnostic Interview
Schedule (DIS), which was designed to be used by lay examiners, in an attempt to achieve
consistency through a highly structured standardized interview, see Robins, Epidemiology:
Reflections on Testing The Validity of Psychiatric Interviews, 42 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry
918 (1985); see also Wittchen, A Comparison of Two Diagnostic Methods, 42 Arch. Gen.
Psychiatry 677 (1985) (describing a German study involving 171 former psychiatric in-
patients and 172 subjects from the general population and concluding that, using ICD-8
as a measuring device, the DIS can be used successfully to diagnose major types of
nonpsychotic psychiatric disorders). For a discussion of computer programs intended to
assist clinicians in reaching correct diagnoses, the use of conversational, interactive models,
and on-line diagnostic monitors and artificial intelligence, see generally Gelernter, Expert
Systems and Diagnostic Monitors, 11 Med. Inform. 23 (1986); Copeland, Schwab, and
Warheit, A Computerized Psychiatric Diagnostic System and Case Nomenclature for Elderly
Subjects: GMS and Agecat, 16 Psychological Med. 89 (1986); and Lesse, The Uncertain
Future of Clinical Psychiatry, 40 Am. J. Psychotherapy 4, 11-12 (Jan. 1986).
154. Malt, Five Years of Experience with the DSM-III System in Clinical Work and
Research: Some Concluding Remarks, 73 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 76, 81 (1986).
155. Id.
156. Chodoff, DSM-III and Psychotherapy, 143 Am. J. Psychotherapy 201, 202 (1986).
157. Mollica, From Asylum to Community: The Threatened Disintegration of Public
Psychiatry, 308 New Eng. J. Med. 367, 371 (1983).
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psychiatric diagnoses.' Assuming this is true, a strict reliance upon
psychiatric diagnoses in the employment context may in some instances
indirectly perpetuate employment discrimination based upon factors ex-
pressly prohibited in other legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of
1964.159
The past few decades witnessed a dramatic change in philosophy
towards the treatment of the mentally disabled. Although for a sub-
stantial period it was thought appropriate to institutionalize and isolate
patients for treatment, in the 1960s and 1970s deinstitutionalization and
reintegration into the community were perceived as much'more beneficial.
Discharge was not necessarily proof of cure but rather a possible form
of treatment. Although this approach is no longer universally accepted,
patients with questionable prognoses continue to be discharged.
Is it desirable to coordinate discharges with efforts to integrate
persons with mental impairments into the workplace? Once popular
notions that a return to the community will benefit the patient are now
subject to debate. 160 If persons with mental impairments do not improve
as a result of involvement in the community and workplace, one can
begin to question the assumptions underlying at least the employment
sections of the Rehabilitation Act.
Accepting for the moment that recovery will not be substantially
encouraged by participation in the workplace, there is always a rather
pragmatic reason to protect employment opportunities. A full or part-
time job may allow a disabled person to assist in paying for his
own treatment and care. The cost of providing custodial care is great,
and employment might ease the strain on family and community. Ad-
ditionally, while it has not been clearly established that employment
assists recovery, neither has it been established that employment interferes
with recovery. Employment might be encouraged as a curative treatment,
with an eye towards determining therapeutic benefits. Finally, the un-
certainty that pervades the area of mental illness has been noted. A
person may receive a diagnosis that has significant implications in the
job market, and thus capable persons can become the victims of labels.
Nondiscrimination assumes that broad generalizations will not be applied
to exclude capable individuals.
Cost considerations are influencing treatment of the mentally im-
paired. Diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) are the response of third party
payors to rising medical costs and represent a system of hospital reim-
158. Id. at 371-72.
159. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
160. Arnhoff, Social Consequences of Policy Toward Mental Illness, 188 Science 1277
(1975).
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bursements based upon groupings of patients requiring similar treatment.
As third party dollars are "capped," psychiatric patients will be shifted
or returned to state mental hospitals.' 61 Community hospitals have pro-
vided outpatient care for the mentally ill, and general hospitals have
been the primary source of medical and psychiatric treatment for de-
institutionalized patients. 62 Fiscal policies are decreasing the capacity of
these units. If the choice becomes more clearly defined as either a return
to state institutionalization or integration into the community, the ques-
tion of who should be afforded employment protection increases in
importance. 163
Employment may be only one component of a complete support
system. It is debatable whether financial independence should be a goal
when society cannot or will not guarantee a complete support system.
Yet an unemployed person may have no other connection with any
support system. Employment may avoid increasing the burden on family
and friends, benefit general community health, and-in the absence of
family and friends-prevent a drift into homelessness. Even if an im-
paired person's parents are providing more than adequate care today,
the parents are older and may very well die first. The question of
comprehensive care must then be faced. Although calculating the benefit
of employment to those with mental impairments is beyond the scope
of this article, it is fundamental to determining the appropriate scope
of protection for persons with mental impairments under the Rehabil-
itation Act.
There are additional concerns associated with financial independence
for persons with mental impairments. Birth rates for impaired persons
living in the community exceed birth rates for such persons institution-
alized. 164 Consequently, concern has been expressed regarding the effects
on gene pools. 65 There are numerous responses to this concern, although
they may not resolve the issue. First, the origin of mental disorders is
unclear. Chemical imbalances, rather than irreversible hereditary forces,
may be the source of mental disorders and these imbalances may prove
treatable. Second, there is a legitimate fear regarding the homogenization
of the human race. The same author that inquires about effects on gene
161. English, Sharfstein, Scherl, Astrachan, and Muszynski, Diagnosis-Related Groups
and General Hospital Psychiatry: The APA Study, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry 131, 137 (1986).
162. Id.
163. See generally, Light, Phipps, Piper, Rismiller, Mobilio, and Ranieri, Finding
Psychiatric Diagnosis-Related Groups That Work: A Call for Research, 143 Am. J.
Psychiatry 622 (1986) (the failure of DRGs to accurately predict hospital costs and a
proposal to substitute a system of DCGs - diagnostic cost groups).
164. Arnhoff, supra note 160, at 1280.
165. Id.
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pools also mentions that some of the offspring of impaired persons are
gifted.166 It may be better to allow the natural spectrum of human
attributes and talents to evolve, rather than attempt to narrow the range.
Finally, given the indefinite nature of the relevant science, it is ques-
tionable whether anyone is sufficiently knowledgeable to justify drawing
a restrictive line as to who should have the financial means to live
independently (and procreate) and who should not.
A psychiatric diagnosis may represent a valuable step in recovery
or treatment. Yet, paradoxically perhaps, it can be extremely destructive
in the employment context. This will certainly be the result if an employer
is allowed to broadly separate conduct and disability. Employers must
not be permitted to isolate the identification or mere existence of an
impairment from the manifestations of that impairment. For example,
an employer must not be allowed to assert that she is not discriminating
against epilepsy, but rather only responding to her employee's intolerable
seizures. This represents too extreme a limitation on the Rehabilitation
Act. Once courts choose to protect manifestations of particular mental
impairments, however, difficulty arises in determining how close the
connection must be between conduct and impairment. Although such a
causal relationship may be difficult to prove, a claimant should be
afforded the opportunity.
Even though alcoholism is expressly protected by the Rehabilitation
Act, 67 one still encounters courts refusing to grant alcoholics protection
under the theory that alcoholic behavior is distinct from the protected
impairment. In McKelvey v. Turnage, 6s a veteran brought an action
challenging the Veterans Administration's denial of his request for ex-
tension of the cut-off date for the use of his educational benefits. The
veteran suffered from a condition known as primary alcoholism, which
was not associated with a separate and distinguishable psychiatric con-
dition. Consequently, in accordance with Veterans Administration's reg-
ulations, no extension of the cut-off date was allowed. The Veterans
Administration rules stated that all alcoholism, except that which is the
result of an acquired psychiatric disorder, is a result of "willful mis-
conduct" and thus renders veterans ineligible for extensions of educa-
tional benefits. 169
166. Id. at 1279, citing Anthony, 6 J. Psychiatric Res. 293 (Supp. 1968).
167. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. 1987); see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
168. 792 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987).
169. Id. at 196-97. The United States Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in
this case concerning the question of whether the Veterans Administration's regulation
violates the Rehabilitation Act. Daily Labor Report, Westlaw, Dec. 8, 1987.
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Although there is a split in the circuits, 70 the McKelvey court
determined that the Veterans Administration regulation, which stated
that primary alcoholics suffer from a willfully caused handicap, was a
reasonable regulation and should be sustained. The court recognized
that much controversy exists as to the nature and cause of alcoholism. 17'
Although the plaintiff presented evidence that medical science recognizes
alcohol abuse as generally outside the individual's control, the Veterans
Administration produced a substantial body of medical literature to
contest the proposition that alcoholism is a disease, much less a disease
for which the victim bears no responsibility. 72 Because of that medical
testimony, the court of appeals sustained the Veterans Administration
regulation. Thus a veteran who is effectively incapacitated because of
severe alcoholism problems can be prevented from getting an extension
of veterans educational benefits because his behavior may be determined
to be willful conduct, and not the alcoholism intended to be protected
under the Rehabilitation Act. When a court decides that "primary"
alcoholics are not protected because they are not impaired, but rather
are engaging in willful conduct, the court goes beyond the Rehabilitation
Act, which only restricts protection of alcoholics and drug abusers to
periods when their substance abuse affects their job performance, or
places property or personal safety at risk.' 73
If a court adopts the position that conduct is independent of a
disability, plaintiffs with mental impairments will be essentially unpro-
tected. There may not be any reason to seek psychiatric assistance until
there is an instance of disturbing conduct. If a court requires a diagnosis
but then allows a defendant to discriminate based upon the conduct
that gave rise to the diagnosis, the Rehabilitation Act will be effectively
eliminated. The Act would then only prohibit discrimination against a
specific label or diagnosis, a charge which could be avoided easily in
many instances by claiming that action was taken in response to separable
conduct and not in response to a disability.
The recent case of School Board of Nassau County, Florida v.
Arline 74 offers guidance for distinguishing the effects of a condition
from the condition itself. Petitioners argued that the school board dis-
missed Arline not because of her impairment (tuberculosis) but because
of a threat to the health of others. 75 The United States Supreme Court
responded:
170. Tinch v. Waiters, 765 F.2d 599 (6th Cir, 1985) (Veterans Administration regulation
equating primary alcoholism with "willful misconduct" violates Rehabilitation Act).
171. 792 F.2d at 200-01.
172. Id.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1985 & Supp. 1987).
174. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
175. Id. at 1128.
19881
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
We do not agree with petitioners that, in defining a handicapped
individual under section 504 [7941, the contagious effects of a
disease can be meaningfully distinguished from the disease's
physical effects on a claimant in a case such as this. Arline's
contagiousness and her physical impairment each resulted from
the same underlying condition, tuberculosis. It would be unfair
to allow an employer to seize upon the distinction between the
effects of a disease on others and the effects of a disease on
a patient and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treat-
ment . 176
Conduct resulting from an impairment should not be considered sepa-
rately. Only this approach will provide the full protection mandated by
the Rehabilitation Act. If a government contractor, the government itself,
or a federally funded program can distinguish the conduct associated
with an impairment from the impairment itself and thereby exclude an
individual based upon that conduct, that individual's Rehabilitation Act
case will end prematurely. The manifestations of an impairment should
be regarded as a component of the impairment. Once an impairment
is established, the complainant should proceed and prove a substantial
limitation on a major life activity. The respondent (federal contractor,
government or federally funded program) will then have an opportunity
to show that the complainant is not qualified. It is at this stage that
the complainant's arguably unacceptable conduct should be considered.
The key factor is that here the complainant receives one last chance.
An individual will be considered qualified if there can be a reasonable
accommodation of his or her impairment. The Supreme Court in Arline
explained that "[e]mployers have an affirmative obligation to make a
reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee.' ' 77 If conduct
can be separated and the case terminated at the impairment stage, this
explicit protection will be denied.
Given the imprecise nature of psychology and psychiatry, it is truly
a difficult task to determine which mental impairments are appropriate
for protection. From a pragmatic viewpoint, it is fortunate for courts
confronted by this question that an action under the Rehabilitation Act
requires more than merely the existence of a mental handicap or im-
pairment. There must be a substantial limitation on a major life activity,
as well as a showing that the plaintiff is qualified for a particular
position. As a consequence of this series of requirements and in light
of the complexity and difficulty of classifying mental disorders, a court
should solicit detailed descriptive evidence of the alleged disability and,
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1131 n.19.
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noting the broad remedial nature of the Rehabilitation Act, make a
determination as to impairment. The court can then concentrate on the
additional requirements that must be established.
A claimant should not be required to satisfy too strict a standard
as to what constitutes an impairment. Any person with an impairment
occupies a precarious position. Sufficient disability must be shown to
establish impairment. On the other hand, if too much disability is proven,
an individual will no longer be qualified. Thus, only a small area exists
within which one can successfully pursue a complaint. The more evidence
that is required to show impairment, the more difficult it will be to
establish that one is still qualified.1 78
Dr. Glenn Miller, one of the psychiatrists in the John Hinckley, Jr.
case, recommends that diagnoses be excluded from insanity trials. 179
Twelve diagnoses were offered in that case. Given the nature of DSM-
III, however, the experts cannot be faulted. 80 Once symptoms, life
history, and course are described, diagnoses are superfluous for court-
room purposes and may actually mislead."8 ' Much of Dr. Miller's ar-
gument is persuasive in the context of the Rehabilitation Act.
CONCLUSION
The question of how to accomodate persons with mental impairments
in the workplace will not disappear. National Institute of Health statistics
assert that one out of every five Americans suffers from a mental
disorder.8 2 The determination of whether a protected impairment exists
should not be strictly a function of whether a diagnosis is offered into
evidence. Additionally, any attempt to completely separate the existence
of an impairment and conduct that may be a manifestation of that
impairment must be avoided. Otherwise, persons with recognized im-
pairments will be deprived of the reasonable accommodation of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Defendants will not be overburdened by this approach. They can
still assert that the disability is not a substantial limitation on a major
life activity or that the plaintiff is not qualified for the position. As
knowledge about mental impairments grows and as the startling costs
178. Furthermore, there is authority suggesting safety and business necessity are distinct
defenses available in addition to the defense that claimant is not qualified. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 32.14 (1986) (administrative regulations for § 794) and Bentivegna v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1982).
179. Miller, Prohibiting Psychiatric Diagnosis in Insanity Trials, 49 Psychiatry 131
(1986).
180. Id. at 137.
181. Id. at 139.
182. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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associated with the treatment of mental disorders become better under-
stood, 83 it will become necessary to review whether existing legislation
encourages the appropriate degree of employment participation for the
mentally impaired.
183. The annual cost to society as a result of treatment, social services and lost
productivity for schizophrenics alone has been calculated at $20 billion by the National
Institute of Mental Health and at $48 billion by the Institute of Medicine of the National
Academy of Sciences. Schizophrenia Puzzle: Toll Rises Amid Hope, N.Y. Times, March
16, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1. A prevalence-based costing estimated the direct and indirect
costs of schizophrenia in the United States in 1975 to be between $11.6 and $19.5 billion.
The lowest of these estimates amounted to 2% of the gross national product for 1975.
Andrews, Hall, Goldstein, Lapsley, Bartels, and Silove, The Economic Costs of Schizo-
phrenia, 42 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 537, 542 (1985).
